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THREE AND POSSIBLY FOUR LESSONS
ABOUT ERISA THAT WE SHOULD, BUT
PROBABLY WILL NOT, LEARN FROM
ENRON
NORMAN STEINt
In 1974, when President Gerald Ford signed the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
into law in a Rose Garden ceremony on Labor Day, he predicted
that because of the new law "the men and women of our labor
force will have much more clearly defined rights to pension funds
and greater assurances that retirement dollars will be there
when they are needed."' In many ways President Ford was
prescient: many of ERISA's reforms have improved the
retirement security of American workers, particularly in the
areas of vesting,2 plan funding,3 and insurance protection for
defined benefit plans.4 In other areas, ERISA has not worked as
well, at least from the perspective of the men and women of
whom President Ford spoke at the Rose Garden ceremony.5
Enron and similar corporate failures are only the latest
illustration of some of the statute's shortcomings.
t Douglas Arant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law.
1 President Gerald Ford, Address at the White Hose Rose Garden (Sept. 2,
1974), http://www.pbgc.gov/about/hptext.htm. (last visited Nov. 18, 2002).
2 See I.R.C. § 411 (2000) (establishing minimum vesting standards);
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 4022, 29 U.S.C. §§
203(a) et seq., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1053 et seq. (2000); see also Daniel Fischel & John H.
Langbein, ERISA'S Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1988).
3 See I.R.C. § 412 (establishing minimum funding standards).
4 See 29 U.S.C. § 1322.
5 For articles critical of ERISA, see generally Leon E. Irish & Harrison J.
Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 109 (1985); John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990
SUP. CT. REV. 207 (1991); Dana M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or
Congressional Compromise?, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1995); Norman Stein, ERISA and
the Limits of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71 (1993); Norman P. Stein,
Reversions from Pension Plans: History, Policies, and Prospects, 44 TAX L. REV. 259
(1989).
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This Article focuses on three particular shortcomings of the
statute: ERISA sections 404(a)(2)6 and 407(b), 7 which for defined
contribution plans relax regulatory requirements restricting
investment in stock of the sponsoring employer; ERISA section
404(c),8 which provides incentives for firms sponsoring defined
contribution plans to shift responsibility for portfolio allocation
to plan participants; and ERISA section 408(c),9 which expressly
permits directors and employees of a plan's sponsor to serve as
plan fiduciaries and implicitly permits them to make critical
judgments on issues pitting the interest of the plan's sponsor (or
the managing employees of the sponsor) against those of plan
participants. The Article also takes a brief look at another
problem with the statute (at least as it has been interpreted by
the Supreme Court), which may yet become part of the Enron
story: ERISA sections 502(a)(2) 10 and (a)(3), 11 which in many
instances bar participants from securing make-whole remedies
against individuals who participate in fiduciary breaches that
harm them individually rather than harm the plan as a whole. 12
The first part of the Article describes the story of the
destruction of the retirement income security for most of Enron's
employees. The final four parts of this Article consider each of
the aforementioned statutory shortcomings related to that story.
I. THE ENRON RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY STORY
Enron may be a complex story in many ways, but its basic
plot line and theme for worker retirement security is
straightforward. Enron sponsored a section 401(k) plan ("the
Plan"), under which employees could elect to defer a portion of
their salaries. 13 The employees were given a menu of nineteen
investment choices,' 4 one of which was Enron common stock. 15
6 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
7 Id. § 1107(b).
s Id. § 1104(c).
9 Id. § 1108(c). See generally Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2.
10 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
11 Id. §1132(a)(3).
12 See generally Muir, supra note 5.
13 See The Enron Pension Investment Catastrophe: Why It Happened and How
Congress Should Fix It: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
Enron Hearings, (2000) (statement of John H. Langbein, Professor, Yale Law
School), available at http://www.senate.gov/-gov-affairs/0124021angbein.htm
[hereinafter Statement of John Langbein].
14 See S. REP. No. 07-226, at 5 (2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
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Enron also made matching contributions to the Plan, up to six
percent of an employee's compensation. 16 The plan further
specified that such contributions would be made in Enron stock,
of which a plan participant had to hold until age fifty 17 and at
which point she could sell the stock and use the proceeds to
invest in other investment vehicles.
Coupled with Enron's structure of matching contributions
and employee allocation decisions respecting their own salary
deferrals, approximately sixty percent of the total value of the
Plan, at the beginning of 2001, was represented by Enron
stock.18
Some Enron insiders, including Cindy Olson, Enron's
Executive Vice-President for Human Resources and a member of
the Enron committee that ran the Plan, were allegedly aware of
Enron's vastly inflated trading value in 2001 (and in fact were
selling their own shares of Enron stock).19  Despite this
knowledge, neither Ms. Olson nor anyone else with fiduciary
responsibility for the Plan considered either removing Enron
stock as an investment option under the 401(k) plan, or selling
Enron matching contributions. Instead, some of the insiders
who were selling their own stock encouraged rank-and-file
employees to continue holding Enron stock and to continue
allocating elective deferrals into such stock.20
II. LESSON ONE: PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT HOLD EMPLOYER
STOCK IN THEIR RETIREMENT PLANS
The first lesson from Enron is the simplest-participants in
qualified retirement plans should not be permitted to hold more
15 See Statement of John Langbein, supra note 13.
16 Enron's matching contribution was fifty percent of the employee's
contribution, subject to a maximum of six percent of the compensation electively
deferred by an Enron employee. Id. at n.4.
17 See S. REP. No. 107-226, at 5 (2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
18 See id.
19 See Amended Complaint, Tittle v. Enron, No. 01-CV-3919 (S.D. Tex. Filed
Nov. 28, 2001) (on file with author).
20 Another fact about the Enron disaster, which has received attention, was
that Enron changed 401(k) record keepers in October, 2001, when the value of
Enron stock was declining in the market. See, e.g., Statement of John Langbein,
supra note 13. Employees were not permitted to change investment options during
this period and thus were unable to dispose of their stock. Many, including the
author of this Article, believe that scheduling a change of record keepers at this
particular time was a clear breach of fiduciary duty. See id.
2002]
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than an insignificant amount of employer stock in their
retirement plan. ERISA already limits the amount of employer
stock that can be held in any defined benefit pension plan,21 and
this restriction should be extended to defined contribution plans.
Section 407 of ERISA limits pension plan investments in
employer stock (and real property) to ten percent of plan assets. 22
This rule does not apply, however, to "eligible individual account
plans."23 An "eligible individual account plan" is, with certain
minor exceptions, any defined contribution plan that expressly
provides for the acquisition and holding of employer securities. 24
As a result, employees can sometimes invest one hundred
percent of their defined contribution account in employer
stock25-in effect, chasing a single rainbow with the hope of
finding a pot of retirement riches at its end. Chasing rainbows,
however, is no way to plan for retirement.
The key arguments against permitting employee retirement
investment accounts to hold more than small amounts of
employer stock are simple. A marvelous twentieth century
economic discovery was the value of a well diversified
investment portfolio, which helps protect investors from the
possibility of large loss from industry and firm-specific failures,
and at the same time allows participants to enjoy some of the
risk premium for equity and other high risk or high return
investments. 26  In financial planning for retirement, where
excessive risk-taking is generally considered unwise, the value of
diversification is not debatable. Moreover, professional
guidelines generally prohibit professional investment managers
from investing more than ten percent of a retirement plan's
value in a single asset. 27
21 See ERISA § 407, 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2) (2000).
22 Id.
23 Id. § 1107(b).
24 Id. § 1107(a)(2), (d)(3)(A).
25 See generally EVERETT T. ALLEN, JR. ET AL., PENSION PLANNING: PENSIONS,
PROFIT SHARING, AND OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS (4th ed. 1981).
26 See infra note 49, testimony of Mr. Norman Stein; Statement of John
Langbein, supra note 13 (pointing out that a well diversified portfolio can eliminate
about seventy percent of investment risk).
27 See generally bus.utk.edu/finance/Torch/Haslam/Objective%20and%2OPolicy
%20Page.htm.9k; www.mcleanbudden.com/english/pdfs/PoliciesGoalsJuly_14_00.
pdf, www.braf.org/pdffiles/invst-ob.; www.braf.org/pdffiles/invst-obj&pol.pdf; www.




Too much investment in a single security is bad, but too
much investment in employer stock is worse. If the employer
fails, the employee loses both retirement and job security. An
economist would put it succinctly: an employee's investment
capital and human capital should not be tied together. More
colloquially, it is not a good idea to put all your eggs in one
basket.
The fact that ERISA permits employers to invest substantial
portions of their defined contribution accounts in employer stock
does not, of course, require employers to design their plans to
facilitate such investments. There are, however, both tax and
non-tax benefits to firms whose retirement plans invest in
employer stock. In the tax area, employers receive immediate
deductions for plan contributions made in employer stock, even
though there is no immediate cash cost to the firm.28 Also, by
setting up an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), which
can be grafted onto a 401(k) plan, a firm and its key employees
can reap extraordinary additional tax benefits including
employer deductions for dividends, 29 income tax exclusions for
the seller of employer stock to the plan,30 estate tax exclusions
for an estate that sells employer stock to the plan,31 partial
exclusion of interest payments to certain lenders to an ESOP,32
the equivalent of deductions for principal payments on a loan
used to acquire employer stock,33  and more generous
contribution limits than for other types of defined contribution
plans.34  In addition, an ESOP that owns an
S-Corporation can, in effect, avoid paying tax on business
income.
Outside the tax area, there are obvious advantages of having
"friendly hands" manage stock. An ESOP in a closely held firm
can also create a market for the sale of stock.35 In addition, some
firms believe that employee stock ownership enhances firm
28 See I.R.C. § 404(a)(3) (2000); see also United States v. Gen. Shoe Corp., 282
F.2d 9, 14 (6th Cir. 1960) (concluding that the tax payer did not realize a taxable
gain when it made the transfer); Rev. Rul. 73-583, 1973-2 C.B. 146.
29 I.R.C. § 404(k).
30 Id. § 1044.
31 Id. § 2057.
32 Id. § 133 (repealed 1996).
33 See ALLEN, supra note 25, at 174-75.
34 I.R.C. § 415(c)(6).
35 See ALLEN, supra note 25, at 174.
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stability and productivity, which is a belief that I will suggest is
open to question.
Many employers respond to these benefits by establishing
plans that require or permit investment in employer stock. For
example, 94.7 percent of the assets in Proctor & Gamble's 401(k)
plan, 81.6 percent of the assets in Anheuser-Busch's plan, and
74.3 percent of the assets of McDonald's plan are invested in
employer stock.36 Moreover, there are more than ten thousand
ESOPs in which virtually one hundred percent of plan assets are
invested in employer stock.37
Despite Enron, and despite a virtual unanimity of opinion
among investment professionals and academics of widely varying
ideological perspectives against 401(k) plans holding employer
stock, 38 there is active resistance in the pension industry toward
legislation to enact meaningful limits on the amount of employer
stock that an employee should be able to hold in his or her
defined contribution plan. This resistance is hardly surprising
given the advantages of employee stock ownership in qualified
plans to the plan sponsor.
The arguments that the defenders of the status quo raise to
such limits, and responses to these arguments, are described
below.
36 See S. REP. No. 107-226, at 9 (2002), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
37 See The National Center for Employee Ownership, A Statistical Profile of
Employee Ownership, at http://www.nceo.org/library/eostat.html (updated April
2002).
38 See, e.g., Hearing Before the Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Cong.
105-06 (2002) (statement of Dr. Teresa Ghilarducci, Ph.D., Associate Professor,
Department of Economics, University of Notre Dame), available at
http://edworkforce.house.gov/hearings/107th/fc/enrontwo2702/ghilarducci.htm;
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, Enron Hearings, (2002)
(statement of Susan J. Stabile, Professor, St. John's University School of Law),
available at http://www.senate.gov/-gov-affairs/020502stabile.htm; Hearing Before
the Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 105-106 (2002) (statement of
Norman Stein, Professor, University of Alabama School of Law), available at
http://edworkforce.house. gov/hearings/107th/eer/enronthree2l302/stein.htm; The
Enron Pension Investment Catastrophe: Why It Happened and How Congress
Should Fix It: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, Enron
Hearings, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of John H. Langbein, Professor, Yale Law
School), available at http://www.senate.gov/-gov-affairs/0124021angbein.htm.
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1. Respect for investor autonomy requires that employees be
given the choice to invest in employer securities; education
can mitigate the problem of non-diversification.
Advocates against formal restrictions on employer stock
argue that respect for investor autonomy makes limits on
employer stock inappropriate, and that investor education can
mitigate the problem of employees allocating excessive amounts
of their investments in plans to employer stock. This argument
is problematic: it suggests that we should accomplish indirectly
through education what we could do more effectively and less
expensively through regulation.
Investor autonomy is a powerful concept. It respects
individual freedom and protects market integrity. There are
certainly limits to how much the government can protect
investors generally against the consequences of their own
astigmatic judgments, but tax-favored retirement plans seem an
appropriate venue for some governmental regulation of
investment behavior-such plans are paternalistic devices whose
purpose is to provide retirement income for plan participants.
ERISA places numerous restrictions on pension plans that do
not apply to investment intermediaries or investors generally.
For example, Enron almost certainly would have violated
ERISA's fiduciary requirements if it provided its participants
with the option of investing one hundred percent of their funds
in any single company in the world other than Enron, or if it
permitted participants to invest part of their retirement savings
by betting on number thirty-two in a roulette game at Atlantic
City.39
Why not educate participants about the undesirability of
investing in employer stock rather than limiting investment in
employer stock? As suggested, education involves resource
expenditures (it is not free), will impose indirect costs (for
example, employee time), is dependent on the quality of
instruction and the aptitude of the student, and will sometimes
be ignored by employees for reasons studied by behavioral
economists. 40 Moreover, it may be naive to expect all or even
39 See generally ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000).
40 See generally Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress'
Misguided Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 361, 378-86 (2002) (arguing that although 401(k) plan
participants make the investment decisions, their decisions are influenced by the
20021
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most such firms to make good faith efforts (and expend
resources) to educate employees on the value of avoiding the very
investment the firms would prefer their employees to make.
Perhaps the most sophisticated argument for education,
rather than regulation, is that a limited number of employees
have rational investment objectives in holding employer stock in
a qualified plan. For example, an employee may have a well-
diversified investment portfolio outside the plan and for tax
reasons wishes to have the potentially high-return employer
stock held in a tax-deferred format. Alternatively, the employee
may have a well-diversified investment portfolio and the plan is
the only venue in which a closely-held firm makes stock
available to its employees. The argument is that by educating
employees on the few situations in which it would be appropriate
to invest in employer securities and allowing them to make the
investment decision, employees for whom it is rational to sue
their retirement plans to invest in employer stock would be able
to do so without endangering the retirement income security of
the majority of the people for whom concentration of retirement
savings in employer stock would be inappropriate.
I do not find this argument compelling. For the reasons
suggested earlier, I am skeptical about the efficacy of education
to dissuade employees from investing their retirement plan
assets in employer stock. A retirement policy should, in my
view, place more of an emphasis on preventing avoidable
disaster for rank-and-file employees, than in facilitating
sophisticated investment strategies for a small group of affluent
retirement-plan participants.
2. Some employees do quite well in employer stocks.
Some opponents of limiting the amount of employer stock in
a 401(k) account have observed that some participants, who have
chosen to allocate all or much of their plan investments to
employer stock, have outperformed the market. 41  This
observation is closely related, but not identical, to the investor
autonomy argument outlined above. The implication of this
choices presented to them and the manner in which those choices are presented to
them).
41 See Sarah Hansard, House Panel Gets Message: Don't Handcuff 401(k)s;




argument is that limits on concentrations of employer stock will
hurt, rather than help, many participants.
While it is true that some participants in defined
contribution plans have prospered from their investment in
employer stock, the volatility associated with an undiversified
investment portfolio will produce losers as well as winners. In
my view, retirement policy should be more focused on preventing
losers (the avoidable disaster noted above) than in creating
opportunities for employees to outperform the market.
3. If forbidden to make matching contributions in employer
stock or if employees are permitted to diversify out of
employee stock too quickly, employers will stop making
matching contributions all together.
This argument reflects the questionable assumption that
employers make matching contributions because they are "good
guys" and not because the labor markets require them to provide
retirement benefits to attract and retain workers. If employers
stop matching contributions, they will find it more difficult to
compete for good employees. Moreover, many firms that have
adopted safe harbor 401(k) plans42 and SIMPLE plans43 have to
provide matching contributions in order to comply with the rules
of those sections. Additionally, 401(k) plans subject to the
ordinary testing rules generally must make matching
contributions in order to induce non-highly compensated
employees to contribute to the plan.44 Without a high level of
such contributions, highly compensated employees would be
subject to restrictions on the amounts that they could elect to
defer.
4. Stock ownership aligns the interests of the firm and its
workers, thereby increasing productivity and stability.
The evidence on whether significant holdings of employer
stock in an individual account plan increase productivity and
firm stability is not conclusive. In addition, to my knowledge,
none of the studies supporting this view control to support the
significant tax benefits to the firm of such ownership. 45
42 See I.R.C. § 401(k)(12) (2000).
43 See id. § 401(k)(11).
4 See id. § 401(k)(3).
45 See The National Center for Employee Ownership, Employee Ownership and
2002]
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Moreover, even if the evidence in favor of productivity gains were
less ambiguous than it is, there is a substantial question of
whether the government should be privileging this type of
compensation arrangement through tax subsidies-subsidies
that can exceed those available to employers who sponsor
retirement plans that do not permit investment in employer
stock.4 6 Finally, the tax subsidy for qualified plans is intended to
improve retirement income security for working people, not to
increase productivity within some firms.
If there are, indeed, productivity gains from concentrated
employee ownership of a firm, firms should be willing, and are
able, to provide stock ownership to employees outside of tax-
subsidized retirement plans.
5. Employee stock ownership results in employees investing in
equity rather than debt, which gives employees access to the
risk premium that.equity investments have historically paid.
The pension economist Jack Vanderhei has demonstrated
that participants in plans that permit investment in employer
stock have a greater propensity to invest in equity rather than
debt. Historically, equity has outperformed debt and
conventional wisdom says that investors with a long-term
horizon, such as individuals saving for retirement, should
allocate a substantial portion of their portfolio to equity
securities. Thus, one can argue from Dr. Vanderhei's work that
employer stock investment options encourages plan participants
toward a more optimal allocation strategy.
Some economists and others, however, have questioned
whether the greater historic returns of equity compared to debt
should be expected to continue in the future.47 There is no
comparable debate on whether portfolio diversification will
improve returns in the future. Given a choice between improved
diversification of investment portfolios or greater increased
preference for equity, one might well choose a policy that
Corporate Performance, at http://www.nceo.org/library/corpperf.html (noting studies
showing that corporations with concentrated employee ownership outperform other
corporations). But see Stabile, supra note 40, at 396 (stating that the "law provides
employer pension plans with such favorable tax treatment, [and] at a considerable
monetary cost").
46 See supra notes 29-34.
47 See generally Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and
Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REV. 777, 830-37 (2000).
[Vol.76:855
LESSONS FROM ENRON
encourages the former, even at the expense of the latter.
Moreover, even if we were inclined to favor a strategy of
increasing equity investment in defined contribution plans, there
are ways of encouraging broadly diversified equity investment,
such as education, that should be preferred to permitting
investment in employer securities. If the government has a role
in pushing investors toward equity investments, a point
questioned by Professor Henry Hu in a recent issue of the Texas
Law Review, there are more sensible ways of affecting this goal
than a policy which results in an undiversified portfolio.48
Despite what I view as a reasonably clear economic and
policy case against concentrated retirement plan ownership of
employer stock, I am not optimistic that Congress will change
the statutory structure of ERISA to limit such ownership. The
arguments against limits, while not persuasive, have provided
politically powerful rhetoric for groups defending the status quo,
particularly the argument for investor autonomy. The
individuals and organizations advocating limits on employer
stock must address the charges that they want to limit employee
choice and that they need to protect American workers against
their inclination toward improvidence. Furthermore, the most
persistent advocates of limits are, for the most part, associated
with academic institutions and lack the organizational and
financial resources necessary to reshape the regulatory regime
against the efforts of entities with an entrenched financial
interest in maintaining the status quo.49
The history of the debate thus far in Congress supports my
pessimism. Senators Boxer and Corzine introduced legislation
that would place percentage limits on the amount of investment
an employee could make in employer stock.50 Senator Kennedy
proposed legislation that would have prohibited a 401(k) plan
from offering employees an investment option in employer stock
if the employer were also making matching contributions in
employer stock.5 1 These proposals, none of which absolutely
prohibited participant investment in employer stock and all of
48 Id. at 884.
49 See, e.g., supra note 37.
50 Pension Protection and Diversification Act of 2001, S. 1838, 107th Cong. § 2,
(2001), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
51 Protecting America's Pensions Act of 2002, S. 1992, 107th Cong. § 102,
(2001), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query.
20021
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which carved out broad exceptions for ESOPs, stimulated debate
but have not found broad congressional support. Indeed, the
only probable change in law that will reduce the aggregate of
employer stock held in retirement plans is a proposed prohibition
of any restrictions on selling employer stock in excess of a five-
year holding period.5 2  While this would be an important
provision, it would not have substantially mitigated the effect of
Enron's collapse, where employees held on to Enron stock
purchased with their 401(k) elective deferrals, stock which had
not been subject to the restriction on sale.
III. LESSON 2: DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN DESIGN SHOULD
NOT SHIFT INVESTMENT ALLOCATION DECISIONS TO
PARTICIPANTS
To some extent, the problems of too much employer stock in
defined contribution plans are a result of a broader shortcoming
of the regulatory scheme governing deferred compensation plans:
ERISA section 404(c), 53 which limits the scope of plan sponsor's
fiduciary responsibilities if the plan sponsor transfers
responsibility for portfolio allocation to plan participants.
Section 404(c) provides incentive for firms to abdicate their
historic role of engaging investment professionals to manage
plan investments.
Prior to ERISA's enactment, and indeed prior to the 1980s,
most qualified plans-all defined benefit plans and most defined
contribution plans-engaged professionals to manage the plan's
assets. In today's world, however, most defined contribution
plans have provided employees with the responsibility for
portfolio allocation. In Enron, for example, employees had
nineteen investment options to which they could allocate their
elective deferrals.
Empirical research into how employees handle investment
responsibility is not encouraging. The evidence suggests that
employees are not very good at designing investment strategies
(and why should we expect that the typical employee would be
good at it?).54 Some employees are too cautious, while others are
52 Pension Security Act of 2002, H.R. 3762, 107th Cong. §§ 210-11, (2002),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
53 ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2000).
54 See Stabile, supra note 40, at 381 (noting that employees can be manipulated
by how the investment information is presented to them).
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much too aggressive in the management of their retirement plan
investments, as was the case with most participants in the
Enron plan.
Professor Susan Stabile has forcefully argued that Congress
should repeal section 404(c). 55 In her view, section 404(c) lacks
adequate theoretical grounding because it is founded on the
illusion that plans incorporating a participant-direction feature
provide employees with meaningful control. In fact, participants
often lack such control because the employer chooses the plan's
investment options and determines the manner in which such
options are presented to the employees. Moreover, participants
may lack in investment experience and training and may suffer
cognitive biases that impede rational investment allocation
decisions.
Professor Stabile suggests that if Congress will not repeal
section 404(c), it should at least require plans to have a broadly
diversified default option from which they could affirmatively
elect out. Such a default option might be a life-cycle investment
fund, in which professional investment managers at
chronological milestones in a participant's life adjust allocations.
There are currently no proposals before Congress that would
either repeal ERISA section 404(c) or create a mandatory default
option for participant-directed plans, as suggested by Professor
Stabile. Congress is instead focused on encouraging plan
sponsors to provide investment education to participants to
assist them in formulating investment allocation strategies. The
House has already passed legislation that would encourage the
availability of investment advice by waiving certain fiduciary
provisions that currently prohibit firms from selling investment
products to the plan to furnish investment advice to
participants.5 6 Not surprisingly, this provision in the House
legislation has been criticized as sanctioning conflicts of interest,
since firms selling investment products would have an interest
in steering participants to investments that serve the
profitability of the firm rather than the retirement planning
needs of the participant.57 The House bill also permits the plan
55 Id. at 401-02.
56 Pension Security Act of 2002, H.R. 3762, 107th Cong. § 105, (2002) (enacted)
available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
57 See Democratic Policy Committee, Pension Security Act of 2002, available at
http://democraticleader.house.gov/uploads/02041 1FUpension.pdf.
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sponsor to bar investment advice concerning an option in the
plan to invest in employer securities. Two Senate committees
have reported legislation that would encourage the use of
independent third parties, who are not otherwise affiliated with
the plan, to provide investment advice.58
Neither the House nor Senate approaches mandate
investment education. But even if they did, education is
problematic, as I suggested in the discussion of employer stock,
because it is expensive and time consuming. Its quality varies
depending on the educator, it is not be effective for all
participants because of differences in participant experience and
education, and it may not counteract powerful behavioral biases
inclining people away from optimal investment behavior.
Moreover, the premise behind education rather than
regulation is, itself, questionable. Proponents of education
endorse the notion that there are correct, or at least preferable,
investment strategies for people saving for retirement.
Implicitly, these proponents argue that we should eschew
regulatory solutions that would use professionals to design
allocation strategies for all participants, for the more costly and
less effective approach of educating tens of millions of individual
investors on how to pursue optimal investment allocation
strategies.
In addition to the more obvious arguments against relying
on individual investors to manage their defined contribution
investment strategies, a more subtle reason for discouraging
participant-directed plans is the emotional burden it places on
plan participants. This argument is eloquently captured in a
cartoon by Don Wright of the Palm Beach Post two years ago,
which is reproduced and spares the reader at least 1,000 words.
68 See National Employee Savings and Trust Equity Guarantee Act, S. 1971,
107th Cong. § 306, available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
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LESSON 3: CONFLICTED FIDUCIARIES WILL SOMETIMES SERVE
THEIR INTERESTS RATHER THAN THE INTERESTS OF PLAN
PARTICIPANTS
During the broad academic, popular, and legislative debates
culminating with the passage of ERISA, there were fringe
suggestions that plan sponsors and their agents should not be
entrusted with the control and administration of employee
benefit plans, since they might yield to their own conflicting
interests. Congress rejected these concerns, expressly providing
that its prohibited transaction rules shall not be "construed to
prohibit any fiduciary from ... being an officer, employee, agent,
or other representative" of the plan sponsor. 59 Agents and
employees of the employer are, of course, subject to ERISA's
rules regulating fiduciary behavior, including the rule that a
fiduciary "shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries" of a plan.60
It is questionable how effectively those rules operate when a
fiduciary confronts difficult and substantial issues of conflict
between the plan sponsors or between its own interests and
those of the plan's participants and beneficiaries.
Congressional hearings and a civil action brought by
59 ERISA § 408(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c) (2000).
60 Id. § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1) (2000).
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participants in Enron's 401(k) plan suggest that the Enron
employees who served as plan fiduciaries may have acted in
their own interest rather than in the plan participants' interest.
Several fiduciaries, including Cynthia Olsen and Kenneth Lay,
knew that the market was overvaluing Enron stock because
market participants were unaware how significantly the
company's prospects were undermined by accounting fraud. Mr.
Lay and Ms. Olsen sold their own Enron stock but did nothing to
prevent plan participants from continuing to purchase additional
Enron stock, or to prevent the plan from accepting and retaining
additional Enron stock as matching contributions. Indeed, Mr.
Lay encouraged participants to continue to invest elective
contributions in Enron, pronouncing the company fundamentally
sound when he knew, or had reason to know, that it was not.
These actions helped support an inflated market value for Enron
stock during a period of time when Mr. Lay and Ms. Olsen were
sellers.
The lesson here is really one of human nature: people faced
with sacrificing their own financial future in order to protect
others may yield to temptation. Putting conflicted individuals in
positions where they are required to make decisions and take
actions pitting their interests against those of others is the
Achilles' heel of ERISA's fiduciary law.
Unlike the first two Enron lessons, for which plausible
statutory changes can be designed but probably not enacted
because of political opposition, the lesson from Enron about
fiduciary conflict does not lead to an easily conceptualized
statutory modification. The most obvious approach to fixing the
conflicted fiduciary problem is barring employers from serving as
fiduciaries. This obvious approach, however, has obvious
problems. The first problem is that it is too broad and expensive.
In most situations employer fiduciaries are not problematic and
bring knowledge of the firm and its workforce to plan
administration. The cost of hiring independent fiduciaries is
substantial and would make it difficult for plan sponsors to
monitor and protect the firm's own interests in the plan. Thus,
prohibiting employer representatives from serving as fiduciaries
would add considerable expense to the costs of plan sponsorship




The second problem is that barring employers from plan
fiduciary responsibilities would not necessarily spare
participants from the consequences of every breach of
responsibility by a conflicted fiduciary under today's statutory
structure. Indeed, an independent fiduciary might not have
been much help in reducing the losses of Enron employees, for
such a fiduciary would not have been privy to the massive
accounting fraud that led to Enron's collapse and might not have
taken the actions that Enron employees contend was required of
Mr. Lay and Ms. Olsen, precisely because they did know of the
fraud. Furthermore, Enron would have, in the first instance,
selected the independent fiduciary. If Enron selected the
fiduciary and the fiduciary served at Enron's pleasure, how
independent would it have been? One need look no further than
Arthur Andersen for disturbing implications.
It would, of course, be possible to amend the statute to
require an inside fiduciary to engage an independent ad hoc
fiduciary in situations where the firm (or its management) has
interests of its own that are at once substantial and in conflict
with substantial interests of the plan's participants. Such
situations should not be difficult for the inside fiduciary to
identify, and an independent fiduciary chosen in such
circumstances would be unlikely to favor the firm or its
management over the participants, both because its attention
would be focused on a single issue and because such a fiduciary
would be cognizant of its own wealth being at risk if it favored
the interests of the firm. Moreover, the statute could require
that the independent fiduciary be unrelated to the firm and be
barred from having any relationship with the firm for a lengthy
period after serving as an independent fiduciary.
The problem with this approach is that the decision to
appoint an independent fiduciary would still rest with the
conflicted fiduciary. The responses of Enron officials to the
various Enron scandals-concealment and covering up-suggest
that the inside fiduciary might not recuse itself in favor of an
independent fiduciary.
Such an approach might still offer some benefits. First, civil
61 See generally Fischel & Langbein, supra note 9, at 1117-19, 1126-28
(discussing the decline in the formations of plans that would likely result from the
disqualification of employer representatives as fiduciaries).
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litigation might be simplified if such a rule were adopted and if
failure to recuse was itself a fiduciary breach and carried a
presumption that the underlying decision was the cause of any
financial loss. Second, there are situations involving conflicted
fiduciaries that are sufficiently unlike Enron and such a rule
might result in recusal of conflicted fiduciaries on occasion. In
the much-discussed Donovan v. Bierwirth62 case, management
fiduciaries purchased employer stock on the open market in
order to fend off a hostile tender offer without concern that the
stock might have been trading above its inherent value. The
conflicted fiduciaries had not even considered recusing
themselves but, we can speculate, might have in the shadow of
an express rule mandating recusal where the fiduciary faces a
substantial conflict between the interests of the firm and the
potential interests of the participants. Such a rule could focus
the attention of at least some fiduciaries on conflicts of interest,
particularly if part of that focus was on the possibly ruinous
financial consequences to the fiduciaries personally.
None of the congressional proposals that address Enron,
however, attempts to deal with the systemic ERISA problem of
the inside ERISA fiduciary acting on substantial matters when
its objectivity is compromised by a conflict of interest.
V. A FINAL LESSON THAT MIGHT EMERGE FROM THE ENRON
FIDUCIARY LITIGATION
Supreme Court ERISA jurisprudence creates questions
about whether plan participants who brought a civil action
against the Enron fiduciaries can recover damages, assuming
that a court holds that the fiduciaries violated their statutory
duties. The question arises because it is unclear that the
plaintiffs can obtain monetary relief under ERISA's enforcement
scheme.
Section 502(a) of ERISA includes two possibly relevant
enforcement provisions. Section 502(a)(2)63 permits a participant
to recover, on behalf of a plan, losses to the plan and any profits
made by a fiduciary using plan assets. The Supreme Court has
held that section 502(a)(2) authorizes a derivative-type action, in
62 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982).




which a participant can sue on behalf of a plan only.64 A
participant cannot bring an action under section 502(a)(2) to
remedy a loss or harm suffered by the participant as an
individual. The participants will argue that the losses caused by
the Enron fiduciaries were suffered by the plan rather than by
individual participants. The Enron fiduciaries, however, will
argue that the losses were not "plan" losses because they
occurred in individual participant accounts and at least the
majority of the losses were the result of participant allocations of
their elective contributions to employer stock.
Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 65 on the other hand, provides
that a participant can bring a civil action to remedy a fiduciary
breach, but that a prevailing plaintiff can only obtain "equitable
relief." The Supreme Court has held that "equitable relief'
contemplates traditional equitable relief and does not generally
include money damages. 66 In Great-West v. Knudson,67 the
Supreme Court held that equitable relief does not include money
damages for a contract violation, nor does it include restitution
unless the restitution is equitable in nature. The Court wrote
that "a judgment imposing a merely personal liability upon the
defendant to pay a sum of money" is not equitable relief.68 The
Enron fiduciaries have argued that any monetary remedy
against them would be legal as opposed to equitable relief and
unavailable under section 502(a)(3). The Enron participants,
however, argue that monetary relief against a breaching
fiduciary is a form of equitable relief. The Department of Labor
has filed an amicus brief supporting the Enron participants'
section 502(a)(3) claim but not their section 502(a)(2) claim.69
The federal courts may ultimately, hold that the Enron
participants cannot bring an action to remedy their losses under
section 502(a)(2) because their action is not derivative in nature
and that they cannot obtain monetary relief under section
502(a)(3) because their claim for such relief is not a form of
equitable remedy. If courts were actually to hold this, Enron will
6 See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1993); Mass. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 139-42 (1985).
65 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
66 Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 220-21 (2002).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 213.
69 See Amended Brief of the Secretary of Labor As Amicus Curiae Opposing the
Motions to Dismiss in Tittle v. Enron Corp. (on file with author).
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teach a fourth lesson, which is that ERISA's remedial sections
let wrongdoing fiduciaries avoid meaningful liability for
intentional harms.
Proposals to revise ERISA's remedial sections have been
strongly opposed by employers and their trade groups and have
not had traction in Congress. It should also be said that as
substantial as the fortunes of some Enron fiduciaries might be,
they will be inadequate to make participants whole even if the
federal courts find them financially liable for the consequences of
their behavior. But if they are held financially liable, others in
their position might be more cautious in the future. Fear of
personal ruin can be a powerful motivation.
VI. CONCLUSION
What happened in the Enron 401(k) plan reveals deep
structural problems with ERISA, which is, after all, a statute
designed to create and protect retirement savings for employees
and their beneficiaries. These structural problems allowing
employees to invest excessively in stock of their employer,
allowing plans to shift investment decisions to employees, and
permitting conflicted fiduciaries to make critical plan decisions
are not being seriously addressed by Congress. Congress is
instead considering a few modest changes on the periphery of the
first problem, primarily requiring plans to permit employees in
some circumstances to sell employer stock in situations where
Enron employees could not. This is not a bad idea if we are
going to continue to allow employers to make matching
contributions in employer stock, but it does not address the
problem that employees should not be investing their retirement
savings in employer stock at all.
So, we watch Congress fiddle as ERISA's structural
problems consume the retirement aspirations of America's
working men and women.
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